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Abstract 
This article offers an analysis of the factors associated with frequency of political discussion among 
representative samples of Italian voters during the general election campaigns of 2008 and 2013. 
This diachronic comparison allows us to assess how political discussion was shaped in two 
campaigns characterized by widely different opinion climates, with the 2013 one marked by 
widespread political disaffection. Our findings show that political discussion notably increased in 
2013 and the factors driving political conversations changed substantially. Whereas in 2008 those 
who voted out of protest and were part of politically homogeneous groups were less likely to talk 
about politics than the rest of the sample, in 2013 the interaction between protest voting and 
network homogeneity strongly boosted political discussion.  
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Introduction 
Over the past three decades, a rich body of research has developed on the determinants and 
implications of political discussion among citizens. However, because most scholars have studied 
these phenomena in Anglo-American contexts and in cross-sectional perspective, we know little 
about the role that contextual factors play in shaping political discussion. We addresses this gap by 
assessing the implications of different types of elections for the intensity and determinants of 
political discussion. In particular, we compare two different elections in Italy and show that citizens 
engaging with a “critical” election, where the political landscape changes compared to the previous 
equilibrium, are more likely to discuss politics, and to do so when they are part of homogeneous 
networks and are disaffected from the political system. 
The 2013 Italian election can be regarded as a “critical” election, in the sense of “those 
exceptional contests which produce abrupt, significant and durable realignments in the electorate 
with major consequences for a long term party order” (Norris and Evans 1999: xxxi). Both the 
dynamics of the campaign and the outcome of the vote were exceptional and signaled major 
changes. As for the campaign dynamics, the most salient aspect of the 2013 election was the clear 
discontinuity in the structure of party competition. Whereas until the previous election of 2008 the 
so-called Second republic (1994-present) was characterized by increasing ideological polarization 
organized around two centre-right and centre-left coalitions, in 2013 the bipolar system was 
disrupted by several new actors, among which at least two established themselves as relevant 
parties: the Movimento Cinque Stelle-M5S (Five Stars Movement)1 and the centrist coalition led 
by the incumbent Prime minister, Mario Monti. Those new political actors challenged the two main 
coalitions quite successfully, as the sum of votes obtained by the centre-right and centre-left 
dropped from 84.4% in 2008 to 58.7% in 2013 (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013a, 14). 
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The second feature suggesting a turbulent electoral environment was a decline of trust in 
political institutions, which according to an index taking different institutions into consideration 
declined from 40% in 2008 to 24% in 20132. The combination of increasing citizen disenchantment 
with politics and dramatic shifts in party competition created new needs for acquiring information 
and expressing disaffection. Consistently, voting choices were made later, with the proportion of 
“late deciders” and “last-minute voters” growing substantially (Ceccarini and Diamanti 2013). 
The fact that citizens have become more “critical” (Norris 1999) and the unraveling of 
bipolar electoral competition may explain the key outcomes of the 2013 election. First, voter 
turnout, already declining in the last two decades, dropped to its historical minimum of 75.2%, 
5.3% less than in 2008—corresponding to almost 3 million voters lost. Second, electoral volatility 
reached the highest level in the history of the Republic (D’Alimonte 2013, 127). Third, the 
fragmentation of the party system increased substantially (Valbruzzi 2013). Such aspects can be 
present also in a “deviating election”, when “dissatisfied voters… defect temporarily to minor 
parties” (Evans and Norris 1999; xxviii). However, critical elections usually occur when new major 
parties become established in Parliament (Evans and Norris 1999, xxxi). This was the case of the 
M5S, which obtained 25.6% of the popular vote and became the most voted party in the House of 
Deputies (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013a), thus marking the end of any form of bipolar 
competition and suggesting that the election can be regarded as critical3.  
As Italy experienced notable changes in the political climate, which made the 2013 election 
a critical one, how did this particular contextual factor affect political discussion? Most studies of 
political discussion have focused on one or a few countries at a single point in time. However, to 
highlight aspects concerning discussion habits and networks dynamics, a comparison across time 
can be very fruitful, especially if it allows to assess the role of remarkable processes, described 
above, such as the loosening of partisan ties, rising feelings of antipolitics, and the emergence of 
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new parties and leaders. Because a broad shift in the political climate occurred between the Italian 
national elections of 2008 and 2013, these elections represent ideal cases for a diachronic 
comparative analysis4 aimed at exploring the implications of such systemic changes that would be 
missed by any study conducted at only one point in time. By comparing a “critical” election like 
2013 to a relatively “normal” election such as 2008, we will thus investigate how changes in the 
national political climate were reflected in the frequency of political discussion and its relationship 
with citizens’ discussion networks.  
 
Hypotheses 
The instability of the 2013 electoral scenario created uncertainty among citizens. As a 
consequence, voters were forced to make a further effort to interpret the changing political 
environment to make their voting choices. Anxiety about political actors has been shown to 
encourage attentiveness toward politics (Marcus et al. 2000). Consistently, interest in the campaign 
rose from about 80% in 2008 to 89% in 2013 in spite of lower turnout (Ceccarini and Diamanti 
2013, 137). Since discussion networks are reliable sources of political information and cues for 
citizens (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Beck et. al 2002; Schmitt-Beck 2003; Huckfeldt, Johnson 
and Sprague 2004) we expect that the rise of interest that is a typical feature of a critical election 
encouraged voters to gather information through discussions. 
Another and partly alternative argument suggesting an increase of political discussion lies 
in the diffusion of disaffection towards politics and distrust in the political class. While sometimes 
those sentiments may produce detachment and abstention, some other times they may be channeled 
into forms of protest. The pervasiveness of feelings of distrust of politicians and unhappiness with 
the functioning of political institutions resulted in a marked change in the climate of opinion 
between 2008 and 2013, one of whose outcomes was the success of the M5S, and in turn this 
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contextual change may have manifested itself in patterns of political discussion. Whereas in 2008 
the climate of opinion, though by no means enthusiastic, was not dominated by antipolitical 
feelings, in 2013 most respondents may have had a sense that the majority of the population shared 
their dissatisfaction and that the party system was about to be shattered. To the extent that they 
responded to this climate of uncertainty by furthering rather than reducing their engagement, 
citizens may have thus intensified their political discussion. 
 In light of the above considerations on the marked change in the climate of opinion between 
the 2008 and 2013 general elections, we hypothesize that political discussion should increase across 
the two campaigns. Our diachronic research design will thus allow us to test whether political 
discussion increased substantially between the normal and critical elections of 2008 and 2013 
(H1). 
Another influential factor in shaping patterns of political discussion is the composition of 
discussion networks. People tend to talk about politics with those who share their political positions 
(Huckfeld and Sprague 1995) and as a result discussion networks tend to exhibit a certain degree 
of internal homogeneity, exposing members to relatively few differing viewpoints (Beck 1991; 
Mutz and Martin 2001). Nevertheless, due to weak ties that connect individuals to loosely 
associated acquaintances who do not share their backgrounds and viewpoints, a certain degree of 
disagreement in discussion networks survives (Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague 2004). According 
to the theory of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1984), the more one talks about politics 
within homogeneous networks, the more he/she is protected from the risk of sanctions or social 
isolation for expressing dissenting views. However, according to Noelle-Neumann, individuals 
adjust their views of what ideas are prevailing by assessing the “climate of opinion” on the basis 
of societal cues coming, among others, from the mass media and discussion networks. Thus, 
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individuals express or conceal their attitudes based on whether they believe them to be within or 
outside the dominant climate of opinion. 
In light of these considerations, we assess how the political composition of individuals’ 
discussion networks interacts with their attitudes towards the political system in shaping patterns 
of political conversation. In particular, we test whether the relationship between homogeneity in 
citizens’ discussion networks and their frequency of political discussion is moderated by political 
disaffection. In their analysis of the 2008 elections Campus et al. (2010) showed that political 
discussion habits were significantly related to ideology. Given the profound political change that 
occurred in Italy between 2008 and 2013, we hypothesize that, while in 2008 individuals who were 
part of homogeneous discussion networks and were detached from the political system may have 
felt isolated from the general climate of opinion and, as a result, may have avoided engaging in 
political discussion, in 2013 citizens who were critical of the system found a much more consonant 
climate of opinion among those with whom they talked about politics, which encouraged them to 
increase their engagement in political discussions. This may also suggest an interpretation that we 
will develop further in the concluding remarks—that in 2013 the homogeneity of networks might 
have been perceived more on the basis of shared feelings of protest than on ideological leanings. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that, due to the critical nature of the 2013 election, voters who both were 
part of homogeneous networks and felt detached from the political system were substantially more 
likely to discuss politics in 2013 than they were in 2008 (H2). 
 
Data and Methods 
This research is based on data collected by LaPolis5 right after the Italian general elections 
of 2008 and 2013. Surveys were carried out in the period 12-22 May 2008 and 13-18 March 2013 
by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI). Research designs and questionnaires are 
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fully comparable. Citizens’ responses were collected by interviewing 2,132 cases in 2008 and 1,528 
cases in 2013. In both cases sampling units were randomly selected. The two samples are 
representative of the Italian electorate for the following characteristics: gender, age, size of 
municipality and geo-political area6.  
The variables taken into consideration are indicators of the main concepts that lay behind 
the relevant theoretical debates in the field of political discussion and the key research questions 
of our study7. Our dependent variable is participation in political discussion, measured through a 
question asking how frequently respondents talk about politics. Our main independent variables 
are the homogeneity/heterogeneity of respondents’ political discussion networks and the meaning 
of individual electoral choice,8 which focuses on whether the vote was motivated by the desire to 
express a protest or trust in the party voted. To test H2 and assess whether our independent variables 
had different effects on the dependent variable between the 2008 and 2013 elections, we include 
the interaction among ì) the two types of election, “normal” (2008) and “critical” (2013), ìì) the 
level of homogeneity/heterogeneity of discussion networks and ììì) protest against or trust in parties 
as main motivation for vote. We entered these variables, together with control variables measuring 
socio-demographic and political characteristics, in four logistic regression models, incrementally 
adding new variables at each step.  
 
Findings 
The frequency of political discussion increased markedly between the 2008 and 2013 
elections, thus confirming H1. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of people claiming to have talked 
“often” about politics with family and friends during the campaign increased by almost 10% 
(39.5% in 2008, 49.6% in 2013). The difference between these percentages in 2008 and 2013 was 
statistically significant at p=.000, based on an independent samples two-tailed t test. As we 
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expected, the critical nature of the election was accompanied by a substantial increase in the amount 
of citizens who frequently discuss politics, as they took stock of the dramatic changes in electoral 
competition and public opinion. 
Figure 1 about here 
 Another interesting finding from our data is that the percentage of respondents claiming 
to be part of networks formed of like-minded discussants increased by almost 20% in five years’ 
time—from 28.1% in 2008 to 45.1% in 2013. The difference between these percentages in 2008 
and 2013 was statistically significant at p=.000, based on an independent samples two-tailed t 
test. This increase is all the more remarkable because it occurred in a markedly uniform way 
across voters of all ideologies (data not shown). 
 To demonstrate the relevance of critical elections for political discussion, we now test H2, 
which predicts that voters who were part of homogeneous networks and felt detached from the 
political system were more likely to discuss politics in 2013 than in 2008. We do this through 
four stepwise logistic regressions on pooled data, from both the 2008 and 2013 surveys, shown in 
Table 1. Model 1 is limited to the standard sociodemographic variables. Model 2 builds on the 
first by adding interest in politics, political information, participation in campaign rallies, 
ideology, and three crucial variables for our study: homogeneity of discussion networks, protest 
voting and election year. Model 3 includes the three two-way interactions between homogeneity 
of discussion networks, protest voting and election year. Finally, Model 4 introduces the three-
way interaction between homogeneity of discussion networks, protest voting and the election 
year. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the three-way interaction on the basis of the 
values predicted by Model 4, with other independent variables kept at their median or mode. 
Table 1 about here 
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Figure 2 about here 
As Model 1 shows, sociodemographic variables display a limited predictive power, while Model 
2 appears more explicative with a notable rise of the Nagelkerke R2: from 7% to 32%. All our 
key variables (network homogeneity, protest voting, and election year) are significant, and the 
fact that coefficient identifying the “critical election” of 2013 is significant confirms that between 
2008 and 2013 some important changes occurred in patterns of political discussion. The inclusion 
of two-way interaction terms in Model 3 does not yield statistically significant results, but in 
Model 4, when we add a further interaction term between network homogeneity, protest voting 
and the year 2013, the goodness of fit parameters of the model remain steady and the three-way 
interaction is significant, thus confirming H2.  
How can this finding be interpreted? In 2008, respondents who were part of homogeneous 
networks but did not vote out of desire to protest, as well as respondents who were part of 
heterogeneous networks but did vote out of desire to protest, were both more likely, all else being 
equal, to discuss politics.9 However, in 2008 respondents who were part of homogeneous 
networks and cast a protest vote were not more likely to discuss politics than the rest of our 
sample, all else being equal.10 This is confirmed by predicted values shown in Figure 2: in 2008, 
among those in homogeneous networks, the likelihood to discuss politics was higher among those 
who voted out of trust (59%) than for protest (53%), but, among respondents in heterogeneous 
networks, those who cast a protest vote were more likely to discuss politics (60%) than those who 
voted out of trust (53%). By contrast, in 2013 respondents who were both part of homogenous 
networks and cast a protest vote were substantially and significantly more likely to discuss 
politics than the rest of the sample. As can be seen in Figure 2, 80% of respondents in 
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heterogeneous networks and cast a protest vote discussed politics, by far the highest percentage in 
our sample, while only 56% of those who voted out of trust talked about politics.  
 In sum, in the normal 2008 elections citizens who were in homogeneous networks and were 
disaffected with the political system were not more likely to talk about politics, but they were, and 
remarkably so, in the critical 2013 elections. In 2008, when criticism of politicians was not a 
dominant feature of the climate of opinion, dissatisfied respondents were more likely to talk about 
politics when they encountered viewpoints different from their own rather than when their 
conversational partners confirmed their feelings. By contrast, during the critical election of 2013, 
disaffected citizens who were part of homogeneous networks engaged more in political discussion 
when they felt their conversational networks were characterized by the same hostility towards 
politics that dominated the climate of opinion. 
 
Conclusions 
Can a shift in the political climate be accompanied by a substantial increase in political 
discussion and alter the association between political discussion and contextual factors such as 
network homogeneity and disaffection towards the political system? Our diachronic comparative 
analysis of the 2008 and 2013 Italian elections suggests it can. As we demonstrated in this study, 
the rise of a wave of protest during the 2013 election corresponded to a notable increase in political 
discussion. Although the cross-sectional nature of our data for the two elections we studied does 
not warrant strong causal statements regarding the nature of the relationship we found, the evidence 
validates our hypothesis that, for a large number of citizens, the 2013 election became an 
opportunity for being actively critical rather than for entering a “spiral of silence” mode, as Noelle-
Neumann (1984) described it. In 2013 detachment from politics was still a possibility, but the 
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option of expressing critical views became the predominant mode of reaction among disaffected 
Italians. As a consequence, while in 2008 political discussion appeared – all things considered – as 
a campaign activity among the others and was especially practiced by politically interested and 
leftist voters (Campus et al. 2010), in 2013 a larger number of voters intensely engaged in political 
discussion than in the previous elections and were more likely to do so if they were part of 
homogeneous networks while also being critical of the political system and, in particular, toward 
traditional parties and leaders. The unexpected success of the Movimento Cinque Stelle-M5S was 
based on those attitudes.  
The first implication of our study is, therefore, that contextual factors, such as those that 
contributed to the shift in the Italian opinion climate between 2008 and 2013, can affect the 
frequency of political discussion in an electoral campaign as well as the factors associated with 
such discussion. As a result, research should focus more intensely on those contextual factors 
instead of concentrating only on classical individual traits and attitudes and on the characteristics 
of discussion networks—which are certainly fundamental to explain discussion habits but are not 
the only relevant factors, as our study has shown. Comparative research designs are particularly 
well suited to capture these dynamics, as they allow to treat as variables factors that inevitably 
feature as constants in cross-sectional, single-country case studies. 
A second issue raised by our research concerns the role of homogeneous networks and their 
measurement. Our main finding is that the interaction between network homogeneity and protest 
vote was associated with the frequency of political discussion in different ways in two subsequent 
electoral contexts. When the opinion climate was characterized by political dissatisfaction, such 
dissatisfaction at the individual level was associated with higher frequency of political discussion 
among those who were part of homogeneous discussion networks. We have also noted that the 
percentage of respondents claiming to be part of networks formed of like-minded discussants 
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increased by almost 20% in five years’ time, and did so irrespective of voters’ ideologies. Our 
explanation has been that respondents – as a consequence of the shift in the opinion climate towards 
a generalized feeling of protest – evaluated the political composition of their networks not only in 
terms of ideology, but also with respect to their partners’ degree of dissatisfaction with politics. 
Therefore, in 2013 critical voters found much more consonant opinions among those they talked 
with, which encouraged them to engage more in political discussions. In 2008, by contrast, in a 
context of substantial stability of the party system, respondents presumably assessed the agreement 
with their discussion networks more in terms of partisan and ideological affiliations. Since we did 
not administer further questions on network members and their political views, our account for the 
difference between 2008 and 2013 is driven by the analysis of contextual factors. However, the 
possibility that respondents may have changed the criteria based on which they assessed 
discussants’ opinions reinforces the perplexities already advanced by several studies about the need 
to go beyond simple self-reports in the measurement of networks’ homogeneity and disagreement 
(Parsons 2010; Nir 2011). In particular, both in cross-country analysis and in diachronic 
comparisons, misinterpretations may occur if respondents’ assessments of the agreement with their 
discussants vary on the basis of country-specific or context-specific factors. This suggests that such 
aspects should be taken into account in the interpretation of findings of survey-based research on 
political networks and discussion. 
 
Appendix 
 
Four logistic regression models were performed using pooled data. Since only respondents who 
claimed that they voted in the elections were asked what their motivations for voting were, and 
since we use this question to measure attitudes towards the political system, our analysis focuses 
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on voters only, and should thus not be generalized to respondents who claimed that they did not 
vote.  
Dependent variable 
Participation in political discussion. “With what frequency, during the electoral campaign 
period, did you talk about politics with your family members and/or your friends?”. The response 
scale proposed was: i) often, ii) sometimes, iii) rarely, iv) never.  
In our regression models, the four-level response scale was dichotomized and coded as follows: 
1=often; 0 if else.  
This coding is due to the fact that the 2013 elections saw a marked increase of respondents who 
claimed they “often” talked about politics; thus isolating these respondents allows us to identify 
the sources of this important change. Our regression models are thus constructed to predict the 
characteristics and political attitudes of those individuals who claim to frequently engage in 
political discussion, rather than of the occasional partakers in political dialogue.  
 
Independent variables 
Standard sociodemographic variables:  
Gender.  Coded 1 for male; 2 for female. 
 Age. Number of years. 
Education. “What is the highest grade of school or level of education you have completed? 
Highest degree of education. Coded 1= elementary or below; 2=secondary school; 3= High 
school or above  
Socio-economic status. “What is your job or profession”? 
Blue-collar (coded 1) 
White-collar (coded 2) 
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Professional (coded 3) 
Tradesman; businessman, entrepreneur (coded 4) 
Student (coded 5) 
Housewife (coded 6) 
Unemployed (coded 7) 
Retired/other (coded 8) 
 
Other independent variables 
Interest in politics: “In general, you would say you are interested in politics...” i) very much; ii) 
fairly; iii) a little; iv) not at all? 
Coded  1= very much; 0.66= fairly; 0.33=a little; 0= not at all 
Exposure to different sources of political information on the campaign. “How frequently, 
during the month preceding Election Day, did you get political information through the following 
source…?”  i) never ii) occasionally; iii) often, coded 0=never; 0,5=occasionally; 1=often.  The 
variable entered in the model is a standardized cumulative index based on the responses for the 
following sources of information: television, newspaper, radio and internet (range 0-1).  
Political ideology. “From a political point of view, do you define yourself as…” i) left; ii) centre-
left; iii) centre; iv) centre-right; v) right; vi) not placed in the continuum. 
Coded 1 =left and centre-left; 2 =center; 3 right and center right;  4= unaligned 
Participation in campaign rallies. “How frequently, during the month preceding Election Day, 
did you get political information through campaign rallies in which you participated” i) often ; ii) 
occasionally ; iii) never. Coded 3=often; 2=occasionally; 1=never. 
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Homogeneity of political discussion network: “In general, the people with whom you talked 
about politics...”: i) mostly agree with you; ii) mostly do not agree with you; or, iii) more or less, 
half agree and half disagree with you. 
Coded 1=mostly agree with you; 0 if else. 
Protest voting : “What would you say was more important for your voting choice… i) trust in 
the party you voted or ii) the desire to protest?”  
Coded 1=the desire to protest; 0 if else. 
Election Year : Dummy variable based on the year in which the post-electoral surveys were 
carried out (2008 or 2013)  
Coded 1=2013; 0=2008  
 
 
 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CRITICAL ELECTION MAKES 
 
16 
References 
Beck, P.A. (1991). Voters' intermediation environments in the 1988 presidential contest. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 55 (3), 371-394. doi: 10.1086/269269 
Beck, P.A., Dalton, R., Greene, S. & Huckfeldt, R. (2002). The social calculus of voting: 
interpersonal, media, and organizational influences on presidential choices. American Political 
Science Review, 96 (1), 57-73. doi: 10.1017/S0003055402004239 
Bordignon, F. & Ceccarini, L. (2013a). Ritratto politico dell’Italia di oggi. In I. Diamanti, F. 
Bordignon & L. Ceccarini (eds.) Un salto nel voto. Ritratto politico dell’Italia di oggi, (pp. 4–
22). Roma-Bari: Laterza. 
Bordignon, F. & Ceccarini, L. (2013b). Five stars and a cricket. Beppe Grillo shakes Italian politics. 
South European Society and Politics, 18 (4) 427-449. doi: 10.1080/13608746.2013.775720 
Campus, D., Ceccarini L. & Vaccari C. (2010) Political discussion in Italy between mass media 
and ideology: insights from the 2008 election. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science, Washington, DC, 2-5 September. 
Ceccarini, L. & Diamanti, I. (2013). The election campaign and the ‘last-minute’ deciders. 
Contemporary Italian Politics, 5 (2), 130–148. doi: 10.1080/23248823.2013.812406 
D’Alimonte, R. (2013) The Italian elections of February 2013: the end of the Second Republic?, 
Contemporary Italian Politics, 5 (2), 113-129. doi: 10.1080/23248823.2013.807599 
D’Alimonte, R., Di Virgilio, A., Maggini, N. (2013). I risultati elettorali: bipolarismo addio? In 
Itanes (eds.) Voto Amaro (pp. 17-32). Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Huckfeldt, R. & Sprague, J. (1995). Citizens, politics, and social communication: information and 
influence in an election campaign. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Huckfeldt, R., Johnson, P. & Sprague, J. (2004). Political disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CRITICAL ELECTION MAKES 
 
17 
Lijphart. A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. The American Political 
Science Review, 65 (3), 682-693. 
Maraffi, M., Pedrazzani A. & Pinto, L. (2013). Le basi sociali del voto. In Itanes (eds.) Voto 
Amaro (pp. 57-70). Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective intelligence and political 
judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mutz, D. & Martin, P. (2001). Facilitating communication across lines of political difference: the 
role of mass media. American Political Science Review, 95 (1) 97-114. 
 Nir, L. (2011). Disagreement and opposition in social networks: Does disagreement discourage 
turnout? Political Studies, 59, 674–692. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00873.x 
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1984). The spiral of silence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Norris. P. (ed.) (1999). Critical citizens: global support for democratic government. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Norris, P. & Evans, G. (1999). Introduction. In G. Evans & P. Norris (eds.) Critical Elections. 
British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective (pp.ixx-xxxx). London: Sage. 
Parsons, B. M. (2010). Social networks and the affective impact of political disagreement. Political 
Behavior, 32, 181–204. doi: 10.1007/s11109-009-9100-6 
Schmitt-Beck, R. (2003). Mass communication, personal communication and vote choice: the filter 
hypothesis of media influence in comparative perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 
33, 233-59. doi: 10.1017/S0007123403000103 
Valbruzzi, M. (2013). Not a normal country. Italy and its party systems. Studia Politica. Romanian 
Political Science Review, XII (4), 617-640. 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CRITICAL ELECTION MAKES 
 
18 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Frequency of Political Discussion with Family and 
Friends.  
(Comparison with 2008 and 2013 General Elections - % of 
Voters) 
 
Source: Post-electoral survey LaPolis - University of Urbino 
Carlo Bo. May 2008 (N=2132) and March 2013 (N=1528) 
 
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A CRITICAL ELECTION MAKES 
 
19 
Table 1 – Dependent Variable: Discussing Politics “Often” 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) B (S.E.) 
Gender (female=ref. cat.) .09 (.08) -.15 (.09) -.17 (.09) -.16 (.09) 
Age .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Education  1.17*** (.13) .48*** (.15) .49*** (.15) .49*** (.15) 
Socio-economic status (Retired/Other=ref. cat.)        
Blue-collar -.25 (.16) -.17 (.18) -.16 (.18) -.17 (.18) 
White-collar .25* (.13) .08 (.14) .08 (.14) .08 (.14) 
Professional .27 (.19) .04 (.21) .02 (.21) .02 (.21) 
Tradesman, businessman, entrepreneur .06 (.18) .14 (.21) .13 (.21) .13 (.21) 
Student .63** (.21) .14 (.23) .15 (.23) .15 (.23) 
Housewife -.20 (.13) .03 (.15) .02 (.15) .02 (.15) 
Unemployed .05 (.20) -.10 (.23) -.10 (.23) -.10 (.23) 
Interest in politics   3.16*** (.18) 3.16*** (.18) 3.17*** (.18) 
Political information index   1.43*** (.20) 1.45*** (.20) 1.44*** (.20) 
Participation in campaign rallies   1.01*** (.17) 1.01*** (.17) 1.01*** (.17) 
Ideology (unaligned=ref. cat.)         
Left and center-left   .58*** (.12) .58*** (.12) .58*** (.12) 
Center   .17 (.16) .18 (.16) .18 (.16) 
Right and center-right   .25* (.12) .26* (.12) .26* (.12) 
Homogeneity of discussion networks   .25* (.08) .15 (.12) .24 (.13) 
Protest as main motivation for vote   .24* (.09) .19* (.13) .30* (.14) 
Year 2013   .53*** (.08) .42*** (.12) .50*** (.12) 
Homogeneity*Protest voting     .01 (.20) -.41 (.28) 
Homogeneity*Year     .21 (.17) .01 (.20) 
Protest voting*Year     .11 (.19) -.19 (.24) 
Homogeneity*Protest voting*Year       .80* (.39) 
         
Constant -1.20*** (.27) -3.38*** (.34) -3.38*** (.34) -3.39*** (.34) 
Nagelkerke R2 .07  .32  .32  .32  
Chi Square (df) 179.34*** (10) 914.93*** (19) 922.89*** (22) 927.09*** (23) 
% correctly predicted 61.2  72.0  71.9  72.5  
Log-likelihood -2227.45  -1854.61  -1853.72  -1851.58  
 
Note. *= p < .05, **= p ***= p < .001. N = 3352 for all analyses 
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FIGURE 2. Graphic representation of main effect sizes 
 
Note: the values are calculated on the basis of Model 4 in Table 1. The three variables whose 
values are varied (year, homogeneous/heterogeneous networks, and vote for protest/trust) are all 
dichotomous. The estimates are calculated by keeping all other variables constant at the median 
(for ordinal- and interval-level variables) or mode (for categorical variables) across the pooled 
sample. 
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Endnotes 
1 The Five Star Movement was founded by the well-known comedian Beppe Grillo, whose 
political program mainly consisted of fighting corruption, cutting the costs of politics, and 
protecting the environment. For details on the nature and history see Bordignon and Ceccarini 
(2013b). 
2 The index is built by taking into consideration the levels of trust in the President of the 
Republic, the Italian State, the Parliament, the European Union, the local government at the 
regional level, the City Council, and the political parties. See the annual reports of “Italians and 
the State”, http://www.demos.it/a00935.php. 
3 As D’Alimonte et al. (2013) argued, although the 2013 election should be regarded as a critical 
election, the long-term success of the M5S cannot be taken for granted yet. Two aspects, 
however, indicate a potential realignment: the first is that the party obtained 21% of vote in the 
2014 European elections, confirming that its roots were still rather solid; the second is that the 
2013 election brought about a change in the social bases of parties, with an overwhelming 
support for the M5S among the youngest cohorts of voters (Maraffi et al. 2014). 
4 As argued by (Lijphart 1971), comparing the same country at different points in time gives 
researchers the advantage of relying on some constants and relatively fewer variables than in 
most cross-national studies.  
5 LaPolis, Laboratory of Social and Political Studies, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Italy. 
6  As for the 2008 post-electoral survey AAPOR Response Rate 2 is 13,58% and as for the 2013 
post-electoral survey AAPOR Response Rate 2 is 10,65%. 
7 The question wording of all variables in the models can be found in the Appendix. 
8 We chose this variable because it allows discriminating between the group of people that can be 
considered closer to the definition of critical citizens and the group of people that can be 
considered simply as disaffected citizens. Comparing the answers to the relevant question in 2008 
and 2013 convinced us that this was the best choice. By contrast, the measurement of confidence 
in institutions has a weaker potential for distinguishing the two groups, since both are prone to 
express low levels of confidence. 
9 This can be inferred from that fact that the coefficients for these variables without interactions 
are positive, although only the coefficient for protest vote is also significant. Since an interaction 
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with the year 2013 is also present in the model, these coefficients refer to respondents who took 
our survey in 2008. 
10 The coefficient for the interaction term is actually negative, although it does not reach 
statistical significance. 
